Arguing Ecosystem Values with Paraconsistent Logics by Afanador, Juan
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
06
36
7v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  1
4 N
ov
 20
19
Arguing Ecosystem Values with Paraconsistent Logics
Juan Afanador
University of Edinburgh
November 18, 2019
Abstract
The valuation of ecosystem services prompts dialogical settings where non-trivially incon-
sistent arguments are often invoked. Here, I propose an approach to the valuation of ecosystem
services circumscribed to a logic-based argumentation framework that caters for valid inconsis-
tencies. This framework accounts for preference formation processes underpinned by a paracon-
sistent model of logical entailment. The value of an ecosystem service is produced in the form
of an ordering over competing land-use practices, as per the arguments surviving semantical
probing.
Keywords: valuation of ecosystem services, abstract argumentation, paraconsistent logics,
Dialetheism.
1 Introduction
The valuation of ecosystem services deals with distinct and contradictory views on value, a mul-
tiplicity that typically reflects opposing or conflicting land-use practices. At times, it is the case
that the same people who acknowledge the importance of the benefits derived from a particular
ecosystem function, and who are also aware of the connection between the two, undertake actions
that contravene the precedence of such knowledge. Furthermore, these decisions are not made in
the abstract, but mediated by various forms of sociality involving dialogue —even if only implicitly.
This document presents an approach to the valuation of ecosystem services that incorporates
the contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in valuation —an approach I term Argumentative
Valuation (AV). AV relies on an argumentation framework structured around Dialetheism. AV’s
argumentation framework enables the dialogical settings where values substantiate, while its di-
aletheic substrate allows for true (truthful) inconsistencies in the values’ antecedents.
The presentation will be restricted to the more technical aspects of my proposal and their inter-
play in a unified analytical framework. Other considerations related to the discussion of a situated
notion of value, and the adequacy of AV therewith are, although following an admittedly artifi-
cial separation, treated elsewhere. Thus, without further preamble, AV’s abstract argumentation
framework will be delineated in Section 2. Section 3 introduces AV by means of a (classical logic-
based) example, Section 4 describes AV’s logical foundation, and Section 5 summarises our main
conclusions and themes for future work.
2 Computational Argumentation
Computational argumentation is defined as the formal modelling of a chain of arguments interacting
in a dialogical setting [Wal09]. The arguments that uphold or contradict a particular position are
compared against each other and probed for flaws. Since every argument is composed of a premise
that implicates a conclusion, this process involves identifying the assumptions and associated claims
that can be defeated with the use of their own set of supporting premises [BH09].
Dung’s model of argumentation is the current paradigm of computational argumentation in
Artificial Intelligence [Wal09]. Also referred to as an abstract argumentation framework (AF) it is
defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Abstract Argumentation Framework [Dun95]). An abstract argumentation
framework is a pair AF = 〈A,R〉. A is a set of arguments and R ⊆ A×A is a binary relation of
attack. An argument A ∈ A defeats an argument B ∈ A iff (A,B) ∈ R. A set S of arguments is
said to defeat an argument A iff some argument in S defeats A.
The semantics of an AF is posited in terms of the framework’s relation of attackR. R effectively
delineates the criteria to determine the acceptability of a particular argument with respect to
distinct arguments. These criteria form the basis for the critical questioning of arguments; a
process that requires establishing which subsets of arguments are conflict-free (Definition 2), in
order to derive the (preferred/stable/grounded) extensions of the corresponding AF (Definition 3),
representing the ultimate collection of tenable or defensible arguments within the framework.
Definition 2 (Conflict-free Sets of Arguments [Pra11]). Let B ⊆ A be a subset of arguments
of AF = 〈A,R〉. B is conflict-free iff there exist no Ai, Aj ∈ B such that (Ai, Aj) ∈ R. B defends
an argument Ai iff for each Aj 6=i ∈ A, there exists Ak ∈ B such that (Ak, Aj) ∈ R, whenever
(Aj , Ai) ∈ R.
Definition 3 (Acceptability Semantics [Pra11]). Let B ⊆ A be a subset of arguments of AF =
〈A,R〉.
• B is an admissible set iff B is conflict-free, and B is defends all of its arguments.
• B is a preferred extension iff B is maximal admissible set w.r.t set-inclusion.
• B is a stable extension iff B is conflict-free, and B attacks all the arguments in A \ B.
• B is a complete extension iff B is admissible and contains all arguments it defends.
• B is a grounded extension iff B is conflict-free, and B is the least complete extension w.r.t
set-inclusion.
The notion of extension can be refined by labelling the arguments in a generic AF = 〈A,R〉,
depending on whether they are defeated in R or not. An argument’s status or label is in iff all
arguments defeating the former argument are out ; conversely, an argument is labelled out iff it is
defeated by an argument labelled as out. Thus, if we define Undecided(B) := A\ (In∪Out), where
In := {A|A is in ∀A ∈ B} and Out := {A|A is out ∀A ∈ B} for some set B ⊆ A of candidate
arguments, the extensions of AF acquire a more terse representation:
Definition 4 (Acceptability Semantics With Labels [CDGV14]). Let B ⊆ A be a subset of
arguments of AF = 〈A,R〉.
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Stable Extension: B is a stable extension iff Undecided(B) = ∅.
Preferred Extension: B is a preferred extension iff Undecided(B) = maxC∈P(In∪Out)|C|.
Grounded Extension: B is a grounded extension iff Undecided(B) = minC∈P(In∪Out)|C|
With Definition 4 at hand, we could further qualify an argument’s status:
Definition 5 (Acceptability Status of an Argument [CDGV14]). For
grounded/stable/preferred semantics, an argument A ∈ B ⊆ A, is justified iff A ∈ In, over-
ruled iff A ∈ Out, or defensible iff A ∈ Undecided(B).
Example 1 illustrates how Definitions 1–5 can be used to derive a set of defensible arguments.
Example 1 (The Odd Defeat Loop [Pra11]). Figure 1 depicts the (semi-formal) argumentation
tree of the abstract framework AFO = 〈{A,B,C,D}, {(A,B), (B,A), (C,A), (C,B), (C,D)}}. Its
grounded extension is empty, while the two preferred (and stable) extensions correspond to PA =
{A,D} and PB = {B,D}. That is, in grounded semantics all arguments are defensible, and in
preferred and stable semantics A and B are defensible, while D is justified and C is overruled.
C D
B
A
Figure 1: Argumentation Tree for AFO
Example 1 not only implements the concepts reviewed so far, it also brings out the importance
of selecting one or another semantics. In this respect, abstract argumentation frameworks may
sometimes seem overly abstract, for however useful Definitions 2–4 may be in determining the
existence of a choice from a set of practical arguments, they do not provide any insights into
the motivations behind said choice or the possibility of predicting future decisions. Value-based
argumentation frameworks (VAFs), on the other hand, incorporate this additional information
into AFs [BCA09], while making preferred semantics the natural semantics to derive extensions in
situations where preferences are deemed crucial to the critical assessment of an argument.
Definition 6 (Value-based Argumentation Framework [BCA09]). A value-based abstract
argumentation framework is a tuple VAF = 〈A,R, V, val, P 〉. A is a set of arguments, R ⊆ A×A
is a binary relation of attack, V is a non-empty set of values, P is the set of total orders on V , and
val : A 7→ V .
The AF notions of defeat, acceptability and connected ideas undergo minor changes when applied
to VAFs. They have to be adjusted for the axiological nature of the latter, as to produce more
informed extensions. This involves complementing the information expressed through R with the
information from val(·), while recognising the distinct preferences contained in the multiple orders
—or audiences— that make up P .
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Definition 7 (Preferences in VAFs). The preferences of an audience a ∈ P are represented as
a transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric relation Valprefa ⊆ V × V .
Definition 8 (Defeat for an Audience [BCA09]). An argument A ∈ A defeats-for-a an argument
B ∈ A, with respect to an audience a ∈ P , iff R(A,B) and not (val(B), val(A)) ∈ Valprefa .
Definition 9 (Acceptable to an Audience [BCA09]). An argument A ∈ A is acceptable-to-a,
with respect to an audience a ∈ P and a set of arguments B ⊂ A, if there exists an argument in B
which defeats-for-a any argument in A that defeats-for-a argument A.
Definition 10 (Conflict-free for an Audience). A set of arguments B ⊂ A is conflict-free-
for-a, with respect to an audience a ∈ P , iff there exist no Ai, Aj ∈ B such that (Ai, Aj) ∈ R or
(val(Ai), val(Aj) ∈ Valpref a.
Definition 11 (Admissible for an Audience [BCA09]). An argument A ∈ A is admissible-for-
a, with respect to an audience a ∈ P , if every argument in a conflict-free-for-a set of arguments is
also acceptable-to-a within the same set.
The definitions of justified, overruled and defensible arguments are similarly adjusted to the
value-based framework. With these and Definitions 7–11 in mind, we can obtain the set of preferred
arguments in a given VAF by simply looking at the maximal admissible-for-a subsets, within the
corresponding set of arguments. Equivalently:
Definition 12 (Preferred Extension for an Audience [BCA09]). A set of arguments B ⊂ A
such that B = maxC∈P(In∪Out)|C|, where In := {A|A is admissible-for-a ∀A ∈ B} and Out :=
A \ In, is a preferred-extension-for-a.
Although the operation of a fully formalised VAF is deferred to Example 2, it is already ap-
parent that the VAF approach is central to AV because of its readiness to incorporate values and
preferences. Arguments are no longer accepted on the basis of an exogenous heuristic, but con-
trasted in accordance with the desiderata of their originating agents. Notwithstanding, the VAF
approach remains too intuitionistic to integrate the qualitative and quantitative aspects of valuation
[BCDD07], and ill-equipped to handle its inconsistencies [DBC04], for these challenges occur at the
more fundamental level of argument formation. Hence my insistence on the explicit formalisation
of the deductive mechanism underpinning VAFs.
3 (Classical Logic-Based) Argumentative Valuation
Argumentative Valuation is based on the logical formalisation of dialogical interactions. As origi-
nally envisioned, its logical formalism should be non-classical. That is, the logic of Argumentative
Valuation should contain non-trivial theses of the form {a∧¬a}, where a is a premise belonging to
the support of a generic argument A ∈ A.
Current research into logics amenable to structural contradictions —within the computational
argumentation domain— is still incipient [AB10, ACV17, Pra18]. For this reason, rather than
presenting the actual logic with which Argumentative Valuation operates, this section elucidates
what is meant by model of logical entailment in the context of my proposal, and how it is articulated
into the abstract argumentation framework by means of an example. The justification of a non-
classical model of entailment is given in Section 4, whereas its integration into a working valuation
framework will be investigated in future endeavours. Let us, then, introduce a classical logic-based
instance of Argumentative Valuation through Example 2.
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Example 2 (Agriculture vs. Restoration in Paramo Sites). Our example represents the
predicament between using paramo sites for agricultural purposes and performing restoration activ-
ities involving the same areas. Our variables of interest are designated as follows:
a : Increased agricultural land-use.
h : Improved hydrological regulating services.
r : Greater number of peatland restoration activities.
s : Increased water supply.
y : Greater agricultural yield.
w : Improved living conditions.
To construct our logic-based VAF we make use of sentential logic with a conventional linguistic
structure. The resulting construct is considered a classical logic [BL99]. This classical logic consists
of well-formed formulae built up from sentential variables —such as h or y— using the sentential
connectives → (implies), ∧ (and), ∨ (or), and ¬ (not). Every argument in our VAF is formed by
combining these sentential elements.
We start off by defining a knowledge base, which summarises all relevant information regarding
our variables:
KB0 := {a, a→ ¬h, a→ y, h→ w, r, r → ¬a, r → ¬y, r → h, y}
The main or root argument will be that of prioritising agricultural land-use, as it leads to a
greater yield (and higher income), i.e.,
A1 := 〈{a, a→ y}, y〉.
In contrast, restoration activities could be directly advocated —agricultural land-use is eschewed
in favour of peatland restoration activities to improve water quality, i.e.,
A2 := 〈{r, r → ¬a},¬(a ∧ (a→ y))〉;
which, in turn, could be refuted by the primacy of the income from agricultural activities over
non-monetary considerations, i.e.,
A3 := 〈{y, y → ¬r},¬(r ∧ (r → ¬y))〉.
Yet, another argument may affirm that restoration is desirable as it guarantees the regulating
services hampered by agricultural activities, i.e.
A4 := 〈{(r→ h)→ (h→ ¬a)},¬(a ∧ (a→ y))〉.
In consequence, the abstract argumentation framework of our example takes the form
AFKB0 = {{A1, A2, A3, A4}, {(A1, A2), (A1, A4), (A2, A3)}};
and its corresponding argumentation tree appears as in Figure 2.
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〈{a, a→ y}, y〉
〈{r, r → ¬a},¬(a ∧ (a→ y))〉
〈{y, y → ¬r},¬(r ∧ (r → ¬y))〉
〈{(r → h)→ (h→ ¬a)},¬(a ∧ (a→ y))〉
Figure 2: Argumentation Tree for AFKB0
a
r
audience-y:
r
a
audience-w:
Figure 3: Hasse Diagram for VAFKB0
To extend our current AF to a value-based framework we recognise V = {y, w} as our set
of values, in view that a → y and (r → h) → (h → w). So, there are two possible audiences
P = {y ≻ w,w ≻ y} with respect to the binary relation ≻ on V , which we designate as audience-y
associated with order y ≻ w and audience-w associated with order w ≻ y. Their respective variables
are tagged with the subscript (·)i for i ∈ {y, w}, whenever the latter’s omission may seem ambiguous.
Finally, note that val = {A1 7→ y,A2 7→ w,A3 7→ y,A4 7→ w} and our VAF can be expressed as
follows1
VAFKB0 = {{A1, A2, A3, A4}, {(A1, A2), (A1, A4), (A2, A3)}, {y, w},
{A1 → y,A2 → w,A3 → y,A4 → w}, {y ≻ w,w ≻ y}}
(1)
The Hasse diagrams in Figure 3 offer an alternative representation of the preferred extensions
of VAFKB0 . It indicates that the preferences contained in our VAF are uninformative, as we
end up with two independent sets of preferred arguments for each audience. Put another way the
values associated with these arguments are trivial: audience-y favours agricultural activities over
restoration as opposed to audience-w, precluding the quest for a common ground. However, if the
knowledge base is extended to include premises stating that “increased water supply generates greater
agricultural yields”, and that “improved regulating services uphold an increased water supply”, i.e.,
KB1 ≡ KB0 ∪ {s→ y, h→ s}, then a new preferred extension arises.
The changes KB1 introduces are reflected in a new argumentation tree; that of Figure 4. A
lighter notation has been adopted in Figure 4, by making ♦y := ¬(a ∧ (a → y) and ♦w := ¬(r ∧
1The symbol “7→” is used to represent the mapping from arguments to values, as per Definition 6. It is distinct
from the implication “→”.
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〈{a, a→ y}, y〉
〈{a, a→ ¬h, (¬h→ ¬s)→ (¬s→ ¬y)},♦y〉 〈{r, r → ¬a},♦y〉
〈{y, (y → ¬r)},♦w〉
〈{r, (r → ¬y)},♦y〉
〈{r, (r → h)→ (¬h→ ¬s)→ (¬s→ ¬y)},♦y)〉
Figure 4: Argumentation Tree for VAFKB1
(r → ¬a). For the sake of brevity, instead of deriving every element in VAFKB1 , let us simply
note that, while the sets of values, and audiences from VAFKB1 are preserved, there are two new
counter-arguments to the root, altering the value mappings between V and P . One affirming that
the dedication of land to agricultural activities negatively impacts hydrological regulating services,
reducing the water supply, the agricultural yield, and eventually eroding the livelihoods of the locals,
i.e.,
A5 := 〈{r, (r → h)→ (¬h→ ¬s)→ (¬s→ ¬y)},♦y〉,
and another stating that by impacting the water supply through regulating services, agricultural
activities could eventually reduce the agricultural yields, i.e.,
A6 := 〈{a, a→ ¬h, (¬h→ ¬s)→ (¬s→ ¬y)},♦y〉,
an argument which will not be factored into the derivation of the preferred extension of VAFKB1
—hence, the dashed contours– but one that will serve to motivate our discussion about the non-
classical counterpart of the approach embodied in this example.
a
a→ y
ry
(h→ s)→ (s→ y)
rw
h→ w
audience-y:
rw
h→ w
ry
(h→ s)→ (s→ y)
a
a→ y
audience-w:
Figure 5: Hasse Diagram for VAFKB1
Like before, Hasse diagrams are used to represent preferred extensions. The Hasse diagrams of
VAFKB1 appear in Figure 5. For audience-y, the preferred extension is {A1, A5}. For audience-w,
the preferred extension is {A2, A5}. The observation that restoration has a beneficial but indirect
effect on agricultural yields, reconciles the two audiences through argument A5. The final result
being that restoration activities should be prioritised over agricultural ones.
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This example comes to an end with a passing remark on argument A6. Argument A6 affirms
that an insistence on promoting agricultural activities may be self-defeating, in view of the interde-
pendency of the circumscribing ecological processes. Put another way, A6 introduces the non-trivial
thesis IC := {a ∧ ¬a}.
Given Definition 10, it would not be possible to find an admissible argument for either audience-
y or audience-w if theses like IC were allowed into VAFKB1 . The reason behind this is that theses
in the spirit of IC involve determining the truth value of contradictions, and the acceptance of
paradoxes as proofs, tasks for which the numerous classical semantics are not equipped [BL99]. Since
inconsistency arises even in the commonplace observation that ecosystem services are interlinked,
recasting VAFs to allow for non-trivial inconsistencies intends to explicate logically a non-negligible
part of the complexity of valuating ecosystem services.
Example 2 shows the advantages of logically modelling the formation of arguments and their
critical probing in the context of Argumentative Valuation. The example, however, does not present
a complete application of Argumentative Valuation, in that it does not reveal a definite set of values.
The reason for this is twofold, the proposed argumentation approach is preliminary, and the trade-off
values are already enmeshed in the production of its corresponding VAF’s preferred extensions.
The tentative quality of the conceptual framework here presented, is not a matter of incremental
development, or a case of missing analytical pieces in the making. Argumentative Valuation is
incomplete, for its non-classical logical rooting is its explanatory power. Even though VAFs furnish
the environment where high-level representations of values and preferences take hold, the logical
and concrete antinomies of conflicting forms of fruition of the Pramo can only be fully appreciated
—I conjecture— through a logical account of their inconsistency —or rather their para-consistency.
Thus, Example 2 is an effort to thematise this conjecture, and by doing so it also showcases some of
the constitutive elements of Argumentative Valuation, for the set of defensible arguments it entails,
and their connected actions, operate on and prefigure their underlying trade-off values.
4 Towards (Dialetheic) Argumentative Valuation
“No proposition is both true and false” [RB00]. This is Reid’s interpretation of the Principle of
Non-Contradiction (PnC), whose quality of being the firmissimum omnium principiorum —Berto
reminds us [Ber07]— has made it the supreme cornerstone of knowledge and science. An indubitably
common-sensical statement on the actuality of knowledge which seems to require no defence.
However, contradictions abound in our experiencing of reality, breaking PnC but, ostensibly,
not reality. This sense of objectivity in the appearance of contradictions is frequent in situations
where interactions are heavily mediated, such as the valuation of ecosystem services, as illustrated
in Example 2. That is, theses involved in the reckoning of ecosystem values —which lest not forget
will be circumscribed to a VAF— commonly take the form {a ∧ ¬a}, for some logical constant or
proposition a and the connective conjunction ∧, e.g.,
increased agricultural land-use is desirable and dependent on increments in the water
supply which, in turn, depend on hydrological regulating services requiring changes in
the use of land away from agricultural practices;
or equivalently, increased agricultural land-use and its negation occur within the same
knowledge base.
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4.1 Dialectical Set Theory
The problem with having both a and ¬a as our premises, in a classical logical system, is that any
other unrelated premise b can be inferred from them, i.e., {a ∧ ¬a} ⊢ b, meaning that from incon-
sistent premises anything follows thus provoking the explosion of the system’s information. More
situatedly, it could be affirmed that the premises increased agricultural yield and no agricultural
activity lead to the conclusion that the Pramo can host sportive activities. That is, the situation
concerning sportive activities has been correctly derived from our initial premises, despite being
irrelevant to the situation concerning agricultural practices.
Logical frameworks where this explosion of information is not valid, i.e. where contradictions
may appear without the framework’s trivialisation, are called paraconsistent. To implement AV
we not only need a paraconsistent logic that does not endorse the principle of explosion, we need
one where contradictions can be true and employed as building blocks for theorem-proving. In
particular, we need a paraconsistent logic that allows for dialetheias, i.e., premises such that both
themselves and their negations are true [Pri07], e.g. where it holds that increased agricultural yield
and reduced agricultural practices are valid.
A simple dialectical set theory (DST) to deal with dialetheias is given by a first-order non-
classical theory with a conventional set of connectives {∧,∨,¬,→} and universal and particular
quantifiers U and P , with denumerable stocks of subject variables and some predicate constants
[Web13]. The formation rules of DST will be like those for other first-order set theories. The postu-
lates of DST will be those of its non-classical quantificational logic together with some characteristic
set-theoretic postulates constraining the predicate constants.
The quantificational structure of DST (DKQ) is defined by the following axiom scheme for
predicate variables A,B,C and D [Web13]:
A→ A (2)
A ∧B → A (3)
A ∧B → B (4)
A ∧ (B ∨ C)→ (A ∧B) ∨ C (5)
A ∧ (B ∨ C)→ (A ∧B) ∨ C (6)
(A→ B) ∧ (B → C)→ (A→ B ∧ C) (7)
(A→ B) ∧ (B → C)→ (A→ C) (8)
(A→ ¬B)→ (B → ¬A) (9)
¬¬A→ A (10)
A ∨ ¬A (11)
A→ A(t/x) (12)
(A→ B)→ (A→ (x)B) (13)
(A ∨B) =⇒ (A ∨ (x)B) (14)
alongside the rules listed below:
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A,A→ B =⇒ B (15)
A,B =⇒ A ∧B (16)
(A→ B)→ (C → D) =⇒ (B → C)→ (A→ D) (17)
A =⇒ (x)A (18)
Equations (2)–(18) will determine the validity of a counter-argument within our argumentation
framework. That is, an attack or defense argument will be drawn based on DST’s axiom scheme
and rules. Once drawn, the extension of choice can be applied to the sets of arguments making up
the VAF’s attack relation. Such is the core idea behind our dialogical approach to paraconsistent
logics.
4.2 Dialogical Paraconsistency
There exist at least two popular representations of logic-based argumentation. One that follows the
premises and overall structure of Argumentation Theory, and a less intuitionistic alternative rooted
in logics. The former corresponds to the tree-like structures of abstract argumentation frameworks
(TA) [AB10] and the other to Rahman and Carnielli’s Literal Dialogues (LD) [RC00]. We will use
both representations interchangably to infuse our argumentative approach to valuation with DST.
LD gives a complete account of dialogues in the form of a series of interactions between two
agents —the Proponent and the Opponent. The Proponent puts forward an argument which will
try to defend against all possible attacks of the Opponent. Hence, the argument will be valid iff
the Proponent succeeds in its defence, given the global and local rules governing their interactions.
Rule Definition
Dialogue Starter The Proponent begins by asserting a thesis.
Move Order Agents alternate their moves.
Classical Attack
Each agent may attack a statement asserted by its counterpart or
defend its own against the latter agent’s attack, including the last not
already defended assertion.
Intuitionistic At-
tack
Each agent may attack a statement asserted by its counterpart or
defend its own against the last not already defended attack only.
Negative Literal
Attack
The Proponent is allowed to attack the negation of an atomic (propo-
sitional) statement iff the Opponent has already attacked the same
statement before.
Winning Criterion
If an agent cannot make generate new assertions —without producing
repetitive moves— the other agent is said to have won the dialogue.
Table 1: LD’s Global Rules [RC00]
The global rules consist of the principles upon which LD dialogues are structured, as presented
in Table 1. Local rules are summarised in Table 2. They describe the symbolism for signaling the
actions that Opponents and Proponents may take in their role as attackers or defenders with respect
to the connectives in DST. These rules grant considerable fluidity to LD. Example 3, illustrates
LD’s rules at work under Lorenz’s D〈1, 1〉 [RC00] interpretation of LD —a paraconsistent, although
not dialectic, dialogue.
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∧,∨,¬,→ Attack Defence
¬A A ⊗
A ∧B ?L/?R (attacker’s choice) A/B
A ∨B ? A/B (defender’s choice)
A→ B A B
Table 2: LD’s Local Rules [RC00]
Example 3 (A Paraconsistent Dialogue in LD [RC00]). Let the Proponent put forward the
inconsistent thesis {a,¬a} as in Table 3, i.e., action (0). The Opponent responds by consecutively
inquiring about the right and left sides of the thesis, i.e., actions ?R and ?L labelled as (1) and (2).
Then, the Opponent attacks with premise a, i.e., action (5) reacting to action (2), which makes
the thesis refutable as the Opponent is the only one of the two who may use an atomic statement
—as per the original/classical set of global rules. If only a single repetition of atomic statements is
allowed per agent —namely D〈1, 1〉—, a form of paraconsistency is introduced as shown in Table
4. In this case the progression of actions is the same, however after the Proponent has responded
to the Opponent’s queries the latter is left with no atomic statement to refute the Opponent’s.
Opponent Proponent
a ∧ ¬a (0)
(1) ?R 0 ¬a (2)
(3) ?L 1 a (4)
(5) a 2 ⊗
The Opponent wins
Table 3: Arguing an Inconsistent Thesis in LD with Classical Rules
Opponent Proponent
a ∧ ¬a (0)
(1) ?R 0 ¬a (2)
(3) ?L 1 a (4)
The Proponent wins
Table 4: Arguing an Inconsistent Thesis in LD under D〈1, 1〉
D〈1, 1〉 provides a very limited view of paraconsistency. In particular, simple formulas such as
a→ (¬a→ b) retain their validity in D〈1, 1〉, trivialising our logical model. To cater for this more
indirect forms of trivialisation, the negative literal rule has been introduced, thereby recognising
that there is some contexts in which a and ¬a can be asserted. To see this let us further formalise
our dialogical logic framework, so we can make use of DST.
4.3 Dialogical Logic
Dialogical Logic is based on a first-order dialogical language where every term is either a variable
or an individual constant. Dialogical Logic’s formalisation builds on the work of [Cle14], and its
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notation is borrowed from [BF16]. However, the interplay between structural and local rules follows
Table 1 and Table 2. Dialogical Logic is formally stated in Definition 13.
Definition 13 (Dialogical Logic [Cle14]). Let L be a propositional language such that φ ::=
φ|φ∧φ|φ∨φ|φ → φ|¬φ. The first lower-case letters in the alphabet a, b, . . . designate logical constants
and lower-case letters p, q, r, . . . refer to atomic formulas in L. Lower-case greek letters φ, ψ, χ, . . .
denote L-formulas, while upper-case Greek letters Γ,Σ,∆, . . . designate finite sets of L-formulas.
Arguments take the form of atomic and L-formulas.
The notion of dialogue requires more structure specifying the interactions between the Proponent
and the Opponent. P and O are used to label the arguments put forward by the Proponent or the
Opponent, who may also be designated through the placeholders X and Y with X6=Y, whenever
their identity becomes secondary. A formal characterisation of dialogues is given in Definition 14.
Definition 14 (Dialogue). A dialogue having ψ[φ0, . . . , φn−1] as its initial thesis, i.e., begin-
ning with the claim that the conclusion ψ follows from the premises φ0, . . . , φn−1, is the set
D(ψ[φ0, . . . , φn−1]) of moves performed by O and P.
Moves are assertions or requests which may serve to attack (A), defend (D) or inquire about a
particular premise. Moves are represented as expressions of the form X-e, where X is as before and
e stands for either an assertion or a request. The symbols “!” and “?” signal the agents’ assertions
and requests, respectively.
Agents’ ranks ri ∈ N, i ∈ {1, 2} with O→ 1 and P→ 2 indicate the number of attacks and
defences they can play within the dialogue D(ψ[φ0, . . . , φn−1]). Agents assert their ranks as so:
O-n := r1 and P-m := r2. The counters of moves in D are denoted by PD(·), and are also referred
to as the dialogue’s position.
In this formalism, the rules in Table 1 and Table 2 can be rewritten as in Table 5 and Table
6, respectively. Their interpretation is preserved as well as their relative inadequacy for capturing
dialetheis
Rule Definition
Dialogue
Starter
PD(P-!ψ[φ0, . . . , φn−1]) = 0,
PD(P-n := r1) = 1 and PD(P-n := r2) = 2
Move
Order
FP (M) = [m,Z],m < PD(M), Z ∈ {A,D}
[P ]−1 = Y-e,M0 ≡ [P ]0 = Y-e,
there are n X-!e moves s. t. FP(M0) = . . . = FP(Mn−1) = [m0, Z], Z ∈ {A,D}
,
and a move N = X-f s. t. FP∪{N}(N) = [m0, Z] iff n < r where X-l := r
Classical
Attack
N = P-ψP ,
then there exists N = O-!ψ ∈ P such that PP (M) < PP(N)
Winning
Criterion
Agent X wins P iff there is no move Q = Y-g s.t. P ∪ {N} ∈ D whenever
[P ]−1 = X-e
Table 5: Global Rules for a Formal Dialogue [Cle14]
It remains to see whether robust forms of the Negative Literal Attack enable more apt envi-
ronments to incorporate the scheme in Equations 2–18 into a formal paraconsistent dialogue. The
viability of doing so will determine the possibility of generating a dialogical notion of consequence
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Assertion Attack Defence
X-!φ ∧ ψ Y-?∧L/Y-?∧R X-!φ /X-!ψ
X-!φ ∨ ψ Y-?∨ X-!φ/ X-!ψ
X-!¬φ Y-!φ –
X-!φ→ ψ Y-!φ X-!ψ
X-!ψ[φ0, . . . , φn−1] Y-!φ0, . . . ,Y-φn−1 X-!ψ
Table 6: Local Rules for a Formal Dialogue [Cle14]
—i.e., a criterion of entailment— capable of dealing with dialetheias. This, in turn, will condition
our capacity to produce semantic tableaux to be used as the building blocks of AV’s argumentation
solver.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This proposal argues that computational argumentation and non-classical logics offer an adequate
conceptual framework to approach the valuation of ecosystem services in the context of Pramo
ecosystems. I refer to this approach as Argumentative Valuation. Argumentative Valuation is
a participatory valuation framework that uses stated preferences to reason about monetary and
non-monetary trade-off values.
The main points made here can be summarised as follows:
Computational argumentation provides an adequate framework to conduct the
valuation of ecosystem services, in terms of the critical questioning of the argu-
ments concerning the fruition of said services. Value-based Argumentation Frameworks
incorporate the preferences and values that support a given claim, creating a relational con-
text where trade-offs are made explicit through the semantics delineated by the maximal set
of admissible arguments. The resulting preferred extensions, or sets of defensible arguments
with respect to this semantical criterion, are manifestations of trade-off values and indicate a
particular ordering of the connected actions on the Pramo.
Argumentative Valuation should be founded upon a non-classical model of logical
entailment. The interaction of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the arguments
typically encountered in the valuation of ecosystem services, are better represented as logical
constructions. Given that conflicts and inconsistencies —i.e., non-trivial theses of the form
{a ∧ ¬a}, where a is a premise belonging to the support of a generic argument A ∈ A—
configure the mode of relation among agents of valuation, the logical circuitry of Value-based
Argumentation Frameworks should be non-classical.
Argumentative Valuation allows researchers to become active agents of valuation,
and the non-classical approach to their implementation do not require the agents
of valuation to be economically rational. Although these claims were not sufficiently
explored, they naturally emanate from the possibilities of a logical framework that does not
abide by consistency, and from the fact that the researchers’ axiological principles can be
directly modelled within the same argumentation framework.
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Some of the themes left for future work include the following:
• Discerning the theory that upholds my insistence on non-classical logics, and circumscribing
its semantics to the theory of Value-based Argumentation Frameworks.
• Incorporating Dialectical Set Theory into Dialogical Logic, to semantic tableaux supporting
AV’s value-based argumentation framework.
• Outlining the order-theoretical problem inherent to the derivation of the new notions of ex-
tension induced by dialetheic semantic tableaux. Given the relative simplicity of Example 2,
the combinatorial considerations involved in the implementation of preferred semantics might
have gone unnoticed.
• Discussing the nature of value in the context of Argumentative Valuation.
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